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Dismembering Families
ANTHONY C. INFANTI *

The concept of the body politic is not new. Elaborate organic
images for human society were richly developed by the Greeks. They
conceived the citizen, the city, and the cosmos to be built according to the
same principles. To perceive the body politic as an organism, as
fundamentally alive and as part of a large cosmic organism, was central
for them. To see the structure of human groups as a mirror of natural
forms has remained imaginatively and intellectually powerful. . . .
The union of the political and the physiological . . . has been a
major source of ancient and modern justifications of domination,
especially of domination based on differences seen as natural, given,
inescapable, and therefore moral (Haraway, 1991: 7–8) (citation omitted).
In the essay from which I took this excerpt, Donna Haraway, a professor of the
history of consciousness and feminist studies at UC–Santa Cruz, cautions us not to
underestimate the extent to which ‘the principle of domination is deeply embedded in our
natural sciences,’ especially ‘if we are to work effectively for societies free from
domination’ (ibid., 8). This cautionary note set me to thinking about the primary place
where science intersects with the individual US federal income tax—that is, in the
deduction for medical expenses under section 213 (26 USC s 213). By chance, as I was
reading this essay and pondering its implications for the medical expense deduction, I
also happened to be watching same-sex couples around me expand their families with the
help of assisted reproductive technologies (eg, intrauterine insemination, in vitro
fertilisation, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and surrogacy). Given the general
heteronormativity of our tax laws, I naturally began to wonder whether section 213 treats
the expenses that these same-sex couples incur to have children in the same way that it
treats precisely the same expenses when different-sex married couples incur them to
overcome fertility problems that prevent a more ‘natural’ form of procreation.
It did not take long to realise that section 213 treats the expenses for infertility
treatments incurred by so-called traditional families differently from—and more
favourably than—the same expenses when incurred by same-sex couples or others in
nontraditional family arrangements. That much was, quite honestly, not a surprise to
me—nor should it be a surprise to anyone who has ever heard of the Defense of Marriage
Act (1 USC s 7), which, for purposes of federal law, refuses recognition to same-sex
marriages. More interesting to me, though, was how section 213 privileged traditional
*
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over nontraditional family arrangements. As I came to see it, section 213 privileges
traditional over nontraditional family arrangements through the construction,
corporealisation, and even dismembering of families. In this essay, I invite you to
accompany me on a short journey as I explain how I see this process of construction,
corporealisation, and dismembering of families play out in the text and context of section
213.
SECTION 213
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code (‘Code’) (26 USC s 1 ff) allows a deduction
for expenses paid during the taxable year for ‘medical care,’ which is defined to include
‘amounts paid . . . for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.’ 1 To prevent a
taxpayer from reaping a double benefit, the deduction is limited to medical expenses that
have not been previously reimbursed by insurance or otherwise (eg, by a tortfeasor). And
a built-in statutory ‘floor’ disallows any deduction for medical expenses not in excess of
7.5 per cent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. The purpose of the statutory floor is
twofold. First, it ensures that the deduction is available only if the taxpayer has incurred
‘extraordinary’ medical expenses that affect her ability to pay federal income tax.
Second, it mitigates the possibility that the availability of the deduction will contribute to
rising medical costs by discouraging the purchase of private insurance (see Joint
Committee on Taxation, 1983: 24).
From this brief description, section 213 probably does not seem a likely candidate
for being tagged as furthering domination in American society. After all, from its
inception, this provision has aimed to alleviate extraordinary financial burdens on
taxpayers who already suffer from significant medical problems—and who, by definition,
lack the help of insurance to relieve those burdens (US Congress, 1942: 7800, 8469). But,
as laudable as this goal might be, careful attention to the wording of section 213 reveals
that it does not apply to all taxpayers equally. In fact, section 213 draws sharp
distinctions between different types of families. It furthers the domination of the so-called
traditional family and concomitantly contributes to the subordination of lesbian, gay, and
other nontraditional families.
Section 213 furthers this domination and contributes to this subordination in a
curious way. There are certainly a number of Code sections that draw distinctions
between different types of families. For example, educational provisions in the Code
allow tax relief for education provided to the taxpayer, a spouse, or dependents (eg, 26
USC ss 25A, 221); the general fringe benefits provision in the Code allows certain fringe
benefits to be provided on a tax-free basis to the spouse, dependents, and even parents of
employees (ibid., s 132(h), (j)(4)); the more specific exclusion for employer-provided
1

For decades, commentators have been arguing over whether section 213 has any place
in a well-constructed income tax (see, eg, Andrews, 1972: 334–35; Surrey, 1973: 20–23;
Kahn, 2002: 27–29). My purpose in this essay is not to add (or detract) from that debate,
but to take section 213 as a given and to examine the ways in which heteropatriarchal
domination might be embedded in that provision.
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meals and lodging applies not only to food and shelter given to the employee, but
sometimes also when given to a spouse and dependents (ibid., s 119); and the various
attribution rules in the Code amalgamate ownership among family members, often
adopting different (ie, broader or narrower) definitions of the ‘family’ depending on the
particular purpose of the attribution rule (eg, ibid., ss 267, 318; see Crawford, 2005). Yet,
section 213 seems to go beyond merely identifying the relevant economic unit for tax
purposes—it actually corporealises that unit. To paraphrase Donna Haraway, section 213
maps the physiological onto the political and creates the ‘body family.’
CONSTRUCTING FAMILIES
As a first step toward understanding the creation of the body family, let’s consider how
section 213 constructs the ‘family’ and what type of ‘family’ it constructs. Section 213
allows a deduction not only for expenses paid during the taxable year by the taxpayer for
his own medical care, but it also allows the taxpayer a deduction for expenses paid for
medical care rendered to his spouse and dependents. Thus, an individual taxpayer is able
to combine the medical expenses of others together with his own medical expenses both
for purposes of determining whether he has exceeded the rather high statutory floor on
deductibility and, if that floor has been exceeded, for purposes of obtaining the tax
benefit from the deduction. Thus, by seeing the taxpayer not just as an individual but as a
head of household, section 213 creates a family unit and determines the deductibility of
medical expenses on the basis of that unit.
Notably, this facet of section 213 dates back to its original introduction into the
Code in 1942 (Revenue Act of 1942: s 127(a)). That historical fact is noteworthy
because, in the early days of the federal income tax, it appears that Congress assumed
‘that the taxpaying unit would be the individual’ (Cain, 1991: 100). Indeed, it was not
until 1948 that Congress introduced the joint federal income tax return as we now know it
(Revenue Act of 1948: s 303); it was not until 1951 that Congress created a separate rate
schedule for heads of household (Revenue Act of 1951: s 301); it was not until 1984 that
Congress fully embraced the idea of the different-sex married couple as a single
economic unit for income tax purposes (US Congress, 1984: 1491; Cain, 2000: 680); and
it was not until 1986 that Congress enacted the ‘kiddie tax’ that makes the family a quasitaxable unit (at least with respect to the unearned income of minor children) (Tax Reform
Act of 1986: s 1411). Moreover, notwithstanding these significant departures from the
early tax norm, commentators continue even today to describe the Code as fundamentally
based on the individual as the taxable unit (eg, Bittker and Lokken, 1999: vol 1, para 2.3).
When departing from the norm of focusing on the individual as the taxable unit in
section 213, Congress had a specific family structure in mind—that of the traditional,
‘nuclear’ family. The relevant family unit for purposes of the medical expense deduction
was (and is) the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, and the taxpayer’s dependents.
Naturally, in 1942, the only ‘spouses’ were the husbands and wives of married differentsex couples. It was not until nearly 55 years later that Congress took the possibility of
same-sex marriage seriously, when it enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. Even
so, the focus on different-sex married couples was made abundantly clear in legislative
history that describes the proposed deduction in the following terms:
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The committee bill allows, within prescribed limits, the deduction of
expenses for the medical care of the taxpayer, his wife, and his dependents
(Seidman, 1954: vol 1, p 1397, quoting US Senate Report 77-1631) (italics
added).
Therefore, in enacting the predecessor of section 213, Congress undoubtedly had
in mind a male taxpayer/head of household. This male taxpayer/head of household could
deduct the expenses paid for medical care rendered to his (presumably, stay-at-home)
wife. 2 He could also deduct the expenses paid for medical care rendered to his
‘dependents.’ For this purpose, Congress borrowed the definition of ‘dependent’ from
then section 25(b)(2)(A), which allowed a credit for dependents. In 1942, section
25(b)(2)(A) allowed the taxpayer a $350 credit ‘for each person (other than husband or
wife) dependent upon and receiving his chief support from the taxpayer if such dependent
person is under eighteen years of age or is incapable of self-support because mentally or
physically defective.’ As originally enacted in 1917, the tax allowance for dependents
was only available with respect to children who were under the age of eighteen or who
were incapable of supporting themselves because they were ‘mentally or physically
defective’ (War Revenue Act, 1917: s 1203). Thus, the children who round out the
traditional, nuclear family form the core of the tax concept of ‘dependent.’
Since 1917, Congress has supplemented this core by allowing other individuals to
qualify as dependents. As mentioned above, even before it enacted the predecessor of
section 213 in 1942, Congress marginally expanded the definition of ‘dependent’ by
allowing any individual (and not just a child) who was ‘incapable of self-support because
mentally or physically defective’ to qualify as a dependent (Revenue Act of 1918: s
216(d)). Since then, Congress has further relaxed the definition of ‘dependent’ to
embrace more than just the taxpayer’s children and ‘defective’ individuals who are
incapable of caring for themselves and whom the taxpayer supports; nonetheless, the
focus is still squarely on relatives of the taxpayer and his/her spouse (ie, the ‘extended’
nuclear family). 3 Indeed, to be a dependent, an individual must either meet the
requirements for being treated as a ‘qualifying child’ or a ‘qualifying relative’ of the
2

This mental picture is consistent with the general mental picture of the framers of the
Code, who consistently refer to taxpayers in the masculine gender (1 USC s 1) and who
included many features in the Code that
reflect the assumption that our society is composed of heterosexual
married couples, with men occupying the ‘public’ sphere and women
occupying the ‘private’ domestic sphere (Staudt, 1996: 1571).
Indeed, section 213 still speaks of a deduction ‘for medical care of the taxpayer, his
spouse, or a dependent’ (italics added).
3
There is a catchall category for anyone else who has the same principal place of abode
as the taxpayer and who is a member of the taxpayer’s household (26 USC s
152(d)(2)(H)). Nevertheless, given the further requirement that the taxpayer must provide
more than one-half of the potential dependent’s support, this catchall category covers
same-sex couples or unmarried different-sex couples at best tangentially (ibid., s
152(d)(1)(C)).
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taxpayer (26 USC s 152(a)). Thus, the basic picture of the household painted by the
predecessor of section 213 was (and, arguably, still is today) that of the traditional,
nuclear family of a breadwinner husband with a wife and children.
CREATING THE BODY FAMILY
But, in section 213, Congress does not merely construct a picture of the family that
replicates the traditional, nuclear family norm. Neither does Congress merely sketch out
what it considers to be the appropriate taxable unit. Instead, in section 213, Congress
creates the body family as a separate person.
Since the enactment of the predecessor of section 213 in 1942, the traditional
family has had the ability to aggregate its medical expenses regardless of whether the
couple files a joint federal income tax return and, since 1948, regardless of whether the
couple avails itself of the income-splitting privilege afforded to married different-sex
couples through the joint return. In other words, even today, a taxpayer can deduct
expenses paid for medical care rendered to his spouse (and dependents) notwithstanding
that the taxpayer and his wife file separate federal income tax returns.
This ability to aggregate expenses even if the spouses actually constitute two
separate taxable units is atypical. The payment of one taxpayer’s expenses by another
does not normally give rise to a deduction in the hands of the payor (Welch v. Helvering,
290 US 111, 114–15 (1933); Jenkins v. Commissioner, 47 TCM (CCH) 238 (1983)).
Instead, the taxpayer whose expenses were defrayed has additional income—potentially
includible in her gross income—and that taxpayer is normally the only one entitled to a
deduction (Old Colony Trust Company v. Commissioner, 279 US 716, 729–30 (1929);
Estate of Slater, 21 TCM (CCH) 1355 (1962); 26 CFR s 1.164-1(a); Revenue Ruling 75301, 1975-2 CB 66; IRS Private Letter Ruling 87-33-002; see Dorocak, 2001: 5–27).
Thus, the norm of focusing on the individual as the appropriate unit for federal income
tax purposes usually dictates that spouses must file a joint federal income tax return—and
become a single taxable unit—before one spouse can deduct (or obtain a credit for)
expenses paid with respect to the other spouse (see, eg, 26 USC ss 21(e)(2), 25A(g)(6),
135(d)(3), 221(e)(2), 222(d)(4); but see ibid., s 911(c)).
Section 213 takes exactly the opposite approach. It allows expenses to be
aggregated across otherwise separate taxable units. A number of other Code provisions
echo—and reinforce—this special treatment by allowing the traditional family to
aggregate medical expenses even if the couple files separate federal income tax returns
(see, eg, 26 USC ss 35(b)(2), (g)(5), 105(b), (c), 162(l), 220, 223; 26 CFR s 1.106-1).
Taken together, these provisions create a separate entity—the body family—that exists
wholly apart from the individual taxable units of husband, wife, and child (or children).
Though the ability to aggregate the expenses of individuals who constitute
separate taxable units across returns is unusual, Congress’s creation of the body family as
a separate person for purposes of section 213—while otherwise continuing to treat the
individual components of that body as separate taxable units—is not. Tax is an area that
is replete with instances of embodiment and disembodiment—that is, of merging two
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separate persons into one, of splitting one person into two, and of recognising a collective
as a group at some points and as a separate entity at others.
For example, the joint federal income tax return and the combination of sections
1041, 2056, and 2523 merge two separate and distinct individuals—the husband and
wife—into ‘one economic unit’ for tax purposes (US Congress, 1981: 127). Yet, even
though the marriage continues, the so-called innocent spouse rules can cleave this single
economic unit into two when necessary to prevent the innocent spouse from being forced
to pay for the tax misdeeds of the other spouse (26 USC s 6015(b)). Conversely, even
after the marriage ceases and the couple formally becomes two separate taxpayers, the
single economic unit will remain intact for tax purposes if either (1) the couple elects to
continue income splitting under the alimony inclusion–deduction regime of sections 71
and 215 or (2) the couple makes property transfers to each other that are incident to their
divorce and subject to section 1041.
In addition, an individual taxpayer can create a single-member limited liability
company (‘LLC’) in many states. By default, such an entity will be disregarded for
federal income tax purposes, meaning that these two persons will be treated as one for tax
purposes (26 CFR s 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii)). At some later point, however, the single owner
could simply file the appropriate form with the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) and
elect to have the LLC treated as a separate entity, splitting the one taxpayer into two
(ibid., s 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i)). Similarly, a corporation will be recognised as a separate
entity ‘even if it has only one shareholder who exercises total control over its affairs’
(Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 US 340, 345 (1988)), effectively allowing an individual
taxpayer to split herself into two (or more) at will.
Partnerships are perhaps most emblematic of how the Code can recognise a
collective as a group at some points and as a separate entity at others. Partnerships are
generally treated as an aggregate of individuals, as evidenced by section 701, which
provides:
A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by
this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for
income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.
At the same time, however, a partnership is treated as an entity for purposes of making
most elections (eg, of accounting and depreciation methods) (26 USC s 703(b); 26 CFR s
1.703-1(b)(1)), for purposes of audit (26 USC ss 6221–31), and generally for purposes of
determining the character of gain or loss on the disposition of an interest in the
partnership (ibid., s 741; but see ibid., s 751). Similarly, S corporations are sometimes
treated as an aggregate of individuals and sometimes as a separate entity (see ibid., ss
1363, 1366, 1371, 1374).
All of these examples—from the coexistence of the joint return and the innocent
spouse rules to the tension between the aggregate and entity treatment of partnerships and
S corporations—underscore the mutability of personhood for tax purposes. If one
taxpayer can so easily become two, two or more can become one, and they all can move
continuously and seamlessly back and forth between these statuses, it should not be at all
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surprising to find that same mutability surfacing—however partially—in the seemingly
innocuous word ‘body’ in section 213.
CORPOREALISING THE BODY FAMILY
Yet, in creating the body family, Congress appears to go a step beyond its usual fluid
notions of personhood. Through section 213, Congress appears to have actually mapped
the physiological onto the political—and politicised—construct of the nuclear family for
purposes of determining which expenses will be deductible as ‘medical care.’ In short,
Congress appears to have corporealised the ‘body family.’
For purposes of section 213, ‘medical care’ is defined in part as ‘amounts paid for
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body’ (italics added). What ‘body’ is Congress
referring to in the latter part of this definition? At first glance, one would likely interpret
the word ‘body’ to refer to the individual, physical bodies of the taxpayer, his spouse, and
his dependents. But given the manner in which section 213 aggregates expenses and
creates the body family as a separate person independent of the actual taxable unit, is that
really the best or most appropriate interpretation of this word? Might this reference to the
‘body’ not more easily and logically be read as a reference to the collective, constructive
‘body family’?
It is common for illness or disease that strikes one part of your body to affect
other parts of your body, whether directly or indirectly. Healing from surgery is usually a
whole body experience, laying you up for days or weeks. Even something as minor as the
common cold can leave you feeling ‘tired and miserable,’ because your body has directed
all of its energy at fighting a virus in your nose or throat (WebMD, 2009). It is also
common for an illness or disease that strikes one member of a family to affect other
family members, whether directly or indirectly. You might catch that cold that your
spouse or child brought home, or you might fight it off but still have to care for the
person who is not feeling well. Some serious illnesses—for example, Alzheimer’s
disease—can actually have an arguably more serious impact on those surrounding the
person with the disease than they have on the afflicted individual.
Section 213 maps these effects of illness onto a ‘body,’ namely, the body family.
If illness or disease strikes one part of the body family, the entire body family is
considered to be affected in just the same way as other parts of my body are affected
when I suffer a head cold. So, even if the taxpayer is not himself ill, an illness or medical
condition that strikes his spouse or dependents (ie, other parts of the body family) is
treated as affecting (infecting?) him, too, thereby permitting the taxpayer—as titular head
of the body family—to take a deduction for medical expenses incurred to diagnose, treat,
or cure that illness.
This corporealisation of the body family is perhaps most easily understood when
considered from the perspective of the reproductive functions of the body. Reproduction
is not a solitary function, by which I mean that the taxpayer/husband cannot reproduce on
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his own. 4 Rather, it takes the taxpayer and his wife—each contributing genetic material
through a sexual union of two bodies—to reproduce on their own. In the context of
section 213, reproduction can be seen not as a function of the individual taxpayer’s body,
but as a function that can only truly be fulfilled by and through the body family, of which
the individual taxpayer’s body forms no more than a part.
The different-sex married couple contemplated by section 213 may, however,
experience fertility problems. In that situation, it will be necessary for the couple to seek
outside medical assistance to fulfill their desire to reproduce. Different-sex couples ‘are
generally advised to seek medical help if they are unable to achieve pregnancy after a
year of unprotected intercourse’ (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2009).
Most infertility problems are treated with medication or surgery (American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2009; Pratt, 2004: 1133). Intrauterine insemination
may also be used to overcome certain problems (Pratt, 2004: 1133). If the couple still
cannot achieve a pregnancy, then assisted reproductive technologies (‘ART’) such as in
vitro fertilisation, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and/or surrogacy (possibly with the
help of a sperm or egg donor) may be contemplated (ibid., 1133–34). These treatments
can be rather costly and often are not covered by insurance, making them an excellent
candidate for a deduction under section 213 if they qualify as ‘medical care’ (ibid., 1123,
1135).
Though there has been some debate about whether infertility treatment qualifies
as ‘medical care’ for purposes of section 213, commentators have made a strong case for
allowing a deduction for the costs of such treatment. These commentators have argued
that infertility treatment qualifies as ‘medical care’ under both prongs of the definition of
that term in section 213: Infertility treatments both mitigate or treat a recognised medical
condition (ie, infertility) and affect a structure or function of the body (ie, reproduction)
(ibid., 1126, 1144–61; Benjamin, 2004: 1130–32; Maule, 1982: 663). In addition, the IRS
has issued a private letter ruling indicating that the costs associated with securing an egg
donor qualify as medical expenses under section 213 (IRS Private Letter Ruling 2003-18017). Similarly, the costs associated with surrogacy should qualify as medical expenses
under section 213 because they constitute ‘payment for a substitute for the . . . diseased or
impaired body part, . . . just as the costs of seeing eye dogs, human guides, and note
takers are deductible’ (Pratt, 2004: 1159). Furthermore, in its most recent publication
explaining the medical expense deduction to taxpayers, the IRS listed ‘fertility
enhancement’ as a type of medical expense covered by section 213 (IRS Publication no
502 (2008) ‘Medical and Dental Expenses’ 8). Even Congress seems to expect that the
cost of infertility treatments will normally qualify as a deductible medical expense (Pratt,
2004: 1160).

4

This may change if human cloning is permitted; however, even were cloning to be
permitted, the individual to be cloned would still need to have a qualified individual
perform the procedure. So, except in rare instances, even cloning should not be a solitary
experience.
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The different-sex married couple’s ability to deduct the costs of using ART to
achieve a pregnancy as medical expenses not only squares with, but also squares, the
corporealisation of the body family. Infertility treatments, including ART, can easily be
described in the reinterpreted terms of section 213. A function of the body family is to
procreate (ie, to grow or extend the body family). If the body family attempts to procreate
for a year without success (ie, if the different-sex couple working together cannot achieve
a pregnancy in that time), an infertility problem is considered to exist. The body family
must then seek medical treatment so that the illness or disease can be diagnosed and
treated or, at the very least, mitigated. Naturally, the purpose of this treatment is to affect
the reproductive function of the body family, by hopefully restoring it to good working
order.
Section 213 further reifies the corporealisation of the body family when the
incidence—and perceptions about the incidence—of infertility are also taken into
account. In about 67 per cent of all cases, the infertility giving rise to the need for
medical treatment (and, hence, deductible medical expenses) is associated with one or the
other spouse, with the incidence split about evenly between male and female infertility
factors (American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2009). In 20 per cent of cases, the
cause of an infertility problem is unexplained (ibid.). It is only in about 10 per cent of
cases that both spouses experience infertility (ibid.). Accordingly, in the vast majority of
cases, it is the infertility of a single spouse (or an undetermined factor) that affects the
couple’s ability to reproduce as a whole.
Given the incidence of infertility, the taxpayer/husband will, in many cases, have
no fertility problems himself. Nonetheless, he will be allowed a deduction for his wife’s
infertility treatments so that they can reproduce together. In fact, as mentioned earlier,
section 213 should go so far as to allow a deduction for the taxpayer/husband’s expenses
in obtaining replacement genetic material from an egg donor or a replacement womb
from a surrogate (or possibly both) in order to mitigate his wife’s infertility problems so
that the couple can reproduce together. Although the wife’s infertility treatment is
directed at curing or mitigating her infertility issues, it cannot escape notice that the
medical treatment of, or a medical substitution for, the infertile wife directly benefits the
fertile husband by allowing him to fulfill his reproductive function. In other words, the
infertility treatments of one spouse benefit both spouses—that is, they benefit the body
family as a whole—by allowing them each to carry out (or obtain a suitable substitute or
replacement for) their separate reproductive functions that can only result in procreation
when the two work in tandem as the body family.
The benefit of medical treatment to both spouses/the body family is even clearer
when the taxpayer/husband himself experiences infertility. Notwithstanding its actual
incidence, infertility tends to be gendered feminine (Ikemoto, 1996: 1008). This is
especially so when we think of ART, because no matter which spouse is infertile,
the technology is used on the woman. And it is the woman who is not
pregnant. Therefore, as a normative matter, it is the woman who is
in/fertile (ibid., 1037).
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Thus, when the taxpayer/husband is infertile and it is necessary to resort to ART, the
fertile wife must still undergo medical procedures to overcome the taxpayer/husband’s
infertility and become pregnant. For example, the fertile wife might have to undergo
intrauterine insemination. Or she might have to have her eggs extracted, fertilised in vitro
(possibly using intracytoplasmic sperm injection), and implanted into her uterus. Or she
might have to undergo both of these procedures multiple times to achieve a pregnancy.
When resort to a sperm donor is necessary because of the taxpayer/husband’s infertility,
the wife still must undergo the same procedure(s) to achieve a pregnancy. In this
situation, the taxpayer/husband is allowed a deduction under section 213 for medical
treatment of his wife—who has no fertility issues at all. The purpose of the wife’s
treatment is not to cure or mitigate an illness or disease that she has or to affect a
structure or function of her healthy body, but to overcome a disease (ie, infertility) that
afflicts the taxpayer/husband. The corporealisation of the body family cannot be more
clearly illustrated than when, as here, section 213 allows a deduction for the cost of
medical treatment of a healthy person in order to mitigate the impact of a disease on the
reproductive functioning of a different person’s body so that the two can together—as the
body family—fulfill their collective desire to procreate.
FURTHERING DOMINATION
Medicalising Procreation
By medicalising procreation as it does, section 213 always already furthers
heteropatriarchal domination. Hopefully, the discussion in the previous sections provided
ample evidence of the patriarchal aspect of this domination. With its construction and
corporealisation of the body family, section 213 certainly betrays an outsized focus on the
traditional family model of the taxpayer/husband with a wife and dependents.
At a more basic level, the patriarchal and the heterosexual aspects of this
domination stem from the unceasing reference to ‘infertility’ treatments. Referring to
ART as ‘infertility treatment’ conjures the image of a different-sex couple who is
encountering difficulty getting pregnant. But this paints only the most partial of pictures
of the groups who use ART to procreate (see Ikemoto, 1996: 1053–57).
Increasingly, same-sex couples and single men and women (whether straight or
gay) use ART to create nontraditional families:
This is not a brave new world, but a fertile new world. Right up to the
present we seem to exclusively link assisted reproductive technology with
infertility. We have books like Beyond Infertility: The New Paths to
Parenthood that itemize all of the assisted reproductive techniques to help
a couple get a child of their own once they have confronted their inability
to conceive. No mention is made of gay, lesbian, or single people who
have no problems with their fertility. Yet increasing numbers of
prospective single, gay, or lesbian mothers and fathers are availing
themselves of these new paths to parenthood. For individuals in same-sex
couples and for single people, the problem is not that their bodies do not
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work, but that they do not have another’s body to work with (Ehrensaft,
2005:5).
Psychologist Diane Ehrensaft has suggested that we ‘take the emphasis off the problem
of infertility and put it on the solution—a solution that embraces not just problems with
an individual’s reproductive system but also the choice to have a child without the
traditional male–female coupling’ (ibid.). Ehrensaft prefers the more accurate and
inclusive term ‘assisted conception’ to refer to the use of these technologies in place of
the more common—and overweeningly heteronormative—’infertility treatment’ (or, the
IRS’s slightly more euphemistic ‘fertility enhancement’).
Dismembering Families
Yet, picking up again on the discussion in previous sections, there is a deeper
level to section 213’s furtherance of heteropatriachal domination. While I was writing
this essay, the US Tax Court issued a decision in Magdalin v. Commissioner (96 TCM
(CCH) 491 (2008)). In that case, William Magdalin, a medical doctor who already had
twin sons ‘born through natural processes’ during a former marriage, had two children
using an egg donor and a surrogate. One child was born in 2005 and the other was born in
2006. Dr Magdalin did not suffer from infertility problems; in fact, ‘[a]t all relevant
times, his sperm count and motility were found to be within normal limits.’ In a passing
reference to claims made on the basis of sexual orientation near the end of the opinion,
the court hinted that Dr Magdalin is a gay man.
This case was before the Tax Court because Dr Magdalin claimed a deduction
under section 213 for the expenses incurred with respect to the egg donor and the
surrogate in these two pregnancies. Those expenses totaled $52,310 in 2004 and $43,593
in 2005, the taxable years at issue in the case. After taking into account the 7.5 per cent
statutory floor on the deduction, Dr Magdalin claimed a $34,050 medical expense
deduction on his 2004 tax return and a $28,230 medical expense deduction on his 2005
tax return.
The court ultimately decided that Dr Magdalin’s expenses did not qualify as
amounts paid for ‘medical care,’ as that term is defined in section 213. The expenses did
not satisfy the first prong of that definition because Dr Magdalin was not suffering from
an illness or disease (eg, infertility) that required diagnosis or treatment. The expenses
did not satisfy the second prong of the definition of medical care because the treatments
did not affect a structure or function of Dr Magdalin’s body. Failing to qualify as medical
expenses under section 213, the expenses that Dr Magdalin incurred with respect to the
egg donor and surrogate were held to be nondeductible personal expenses (26 USC s
262).
The Tax Court’s treatment of Dr Magdalin in this case portends the tax treatment
of other nontraditional families attempting to conceive through the use of ART. In Dr
Magdalin’s case, the Tax Court and the IRS focused their attention both on the need for a
medical diagnosis of infertility and on the taxpayer’s ‘male body.’ The focus on the
taxpayer’s own individual body contrasts sharply with section 213’s construction and
corporealisation of the body family in the case of different-sex married couples. This dual
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focus on a diagnosis of infertility and the corporeal body of the individual taxpayer
creates the possibility of a constellation of tax treatments that vary depending on the
composition of the nontraditional family.
In the case of unmarried different-sex couples, resort to ART will only be
necessary where infertility actually does exist. At least some of the cost for the medical
treatments for this infertility should be deductible under section 213. However, unless
one partner is the dependent of the other for purposes of section 213 (see n 3 above), the
Tax Court’s and the IRS’s focus on the effect of medical treatments on the taxpayer’s
own, individual body raises a question as to how far deductibility will go. For example, if
the male partner in an unmarried different-sex couple is infertile, will treatments of the
female partner be deductible because they mitigate the male partner’s infertility or will
the treatments be nondeductible because they do not affect the male partner’s own
individual body?
In the case of same-sex couples and single individuals, the Tax Court’s and the
IRS’s dual focus may significantly limit the possibility of deducting expenses associated
with ART. For lesbian couples and single women without fertility issues, it seems likely
that the cost of obtaining donated sperm would not be deductible because of the lack of
an infertility diagnosis and because the donated sperm does not, by itself, affect a
structure or function of the woman’s body.
The cost of intrauterine insemination using that donated sperm raises interesting
questions. If the woman is fertile, would a deduction for the intrauterine insemination be
disallowed on the ground that the procedure is not medically indicated, but merely a
result of her personal choice as to how to reproduce? Or would a deduction be allowed on
the ground that intrauterine insemination affects a structure or function of her body? Or
would that ground for deductibility also be jeopardised by arguments about personal
choice, especially in view of congressionally imposed restrictions on the deductibility of
cosmetic surgery that are based on just such arguments? Compounding these questions,
the IRS specifically argued in Dr Magdalin’s case that it did ‘not believe that procreation
is a covered function of petitioner’s male body within the meaning of section 213(d)(1).’
Though unexplained, this assertion certainly lends itself to the interpretation that section
213 does not cover procreation as a function of an individual taxpayer’s body, but only as
a collective function of what I have termed the body family. This assertion may,
therefore, indicate incipient hostility on the part of the IRS to arguments that an
unmarried individual should be allowed to deduct the cost of ART under the second (ie,
‘structure or function’) prong of the definition of medical care in section 213.
If the woman is experiencing fertility problems (eg, there are several rounds of
intrauterine insemination without producing a pregnancy), then it would seem that the
cost of in vitro fertilisation (or possibly even a surrogate) would more likely be
deductible as a medically indicated treatment for infertility (or as a substitute for the
impaired body part). But is the cost of donated sperm a part of this medically indicated
treatment or, in keeping with the IRS’s views concerning section 213’s limited coverage
of the procreative function, just an action by an indispensable ‘other’?

DISCUSSION DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

13

DISMEMBERING FAMILIES

[7-Apr-09]

For gay couples and single men without fertility issues, Dr Magdalin’s case is
particularly instructive. For them, none of the expenses of ART will be deductible both
because they lack a diagnosis of infertility and because none of the ART procedures will
be performed on their bodies. For a man with infertility issues, a question arises as to
what exactly will be included under the rubric of infertility treatment for purposes of
section 213? Will the costs associated with in vitro fertilisation and surrogacy be
deductible because they mitigate the effects of male infertility? Or, as with the unmarried
different-sex couple, will these costs not be deductible because the treatments do not
affect the man’s own body?
Encouraging One Family Form and Discouraging All Others
In each of these situations, the questions about the deductibility under section 213
of expenses associated with ART stem directly from the sharp distinctions drawn in that
provision between traditional and nontraditional families. On the one hand, section 213
both constructs and corporealises the traditional family. By treating the traditional family
as a single ‘body,’ section 213 elides questions about the necessary identity of the
recipient of medical treatment. This is best illustrated by the ability of an infertile
taxpayer/husband to deduct the cost of ART treatment administered to his fertile wife. On
the other hand, in the case of nontraditional families, section 213 places questions about
the identity of the recipient of medical treatments front and center in any analysis of the
deductibility of expenses associated with ART. These questions come to the foreground
because section 213 generally works to dismember nontraditional families. In other
words, section 213 refuses to see the nontraditional family as a unit capable of
procreation. Instead of seeing a family, section 213 sees an individual who, by himself or
herself, is incapable of procreation. 5
This dismembering of nontraditional families contributes significantly to section
213’s furthering of heteropatriarchal domination. For unmarried heterosexual couples
experiencing infertility problems, section 213 creates a powerful economic incentive to
marry so that the federal government will help to defray the costs of potentially expensive
infertility treatments. For same-sex couples and singles, section 213 will often deny that
possibility outright, effectively placing ART out of the reach of all but the most affluent
of same-sex couples and singles (ie, those who can afford to pay for these procedures out
of their own pocket). Thus, even beyond the normative privileging of traditional over
nontraditional family arrangements, section 213 creates a financial incentive for affected

5

These sharp distinctions between traditional and nontraditional families are replicated
and reinforced wherever section 213 and its standards are incorporated by reference in
the Code. For example, even were coverage for ART treatments covered under an
employer-provided health insurance plan, section 105(b) only allows a plan’s
reimbursements for such treatments to be excluded from gross income if those treatments
qualify as “medical care (as defined in section 213(d).” In addition, a payment of
another’s medical expenses cannot escape gift tax unless it is made to a person who
provides “medical care as defined in section 213(d).” 26 USC s 2503(e)(2)(B).
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different-sex couples to marry and erects a financial barrier to procreation by same-sex
couples and single individuals.
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